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Takatoshi Ito and Anne 0.  Krueger 
The phenomenal economic growth of the international economy over the 
past half-century has been in part caused by,  and in part the result of, 
falling real and artificial barriers to international transactions among na- 
tions. Real barriers, such as transport and communications costs, have 
fallen sharply. It is estimated that the real cost of a three-minute phone call 
between London and New York, for example, is now less than 3 percent of 
what it was prior to World War 11. Likewise, the cost of ocean shipping 
has dropped by about 80 percent over the same period, while air transport 
has  become so cheap  that  many  goods are now  air-freighted between 
countries. As to artificial barriers, eight rounds of multilateral trade nego- 
tiations under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
have resulted in a virtual elimination of quantitative restrictions on trade 
among industrialized countries and a reduction in average tariff rates on 
manufactured goods from close to 50 percent to under 5 percent. 
Success in some dimensions normally brings new problems to light, and 
that is nowhere more true than in international trade relations. The great 
decline in transactions and tariff costs between countries has made pro- 
ducers everywhere extremely sensitive to governmental measures that im- 
pose even small cost differentials on them relative to their foreign competi- 
tors. Calls for a “level playing field” are frequently heard, with claims that 
foreign industries have an “unfair” advantage because of subsidies from 
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their  government or cross-subsidies from domestic monopoly positions 
created by the home government. Appeals for protection also come from 
producers whose costs are increased by domestic regulatory measures for 
causes such as the environment. Likewise, as more goods and services have 
become tradable, the ability of inefficient regulatory regimes in domestic 
economies to handicap  producers relative to their  foreign competitors 
has increased. 
Thus two fields that were formerly fairly independent-policy  analysis 
of regulation  and competition and of international economic policy- 
have moved closer together. One result has been calls for an international 
“competition” policy. Such a policy would entail an international agree- 
ment on what constitutes fair business practices and would incorporate 
that agreement into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Analyses of 
what competition policy might be and what it might do are under way 
throughout the world, and the topic is inherently complex. 
One group of advocates of competition policy are those who believe 
that antidumping measures in many countries have gone far beyond their 
intended purpose (of preventing predatory pricing) and are used as a form 
of protection.’ They believe that competition policy could replace anti- 
dumping practices with beneficial effects for the efficiency of the global 
trading system. 
A second group of advocates believes that traditional (national) anti- 
monopoly and antitrust laws are no longer serving their original purpose. 
In  traditional  industrial  organization  theory,  the market  share  of  the 
largest company or top three companies was an important indicator of 
the degree of competition in the market. However, competition can come 
from new entrants, imports, or substitute new products or services. The 
loss of  monopoly  power of local telephone companies with the advent 
of cellular telephones, and the potential threat of cable TV competition 
illustrates the point. Likewise, the fact that there are only three major U.S. 
automobile companies no longer suggests a highly concentrated industry 
because competition from foreign auto manufacturers severely limits any 
monopoly power. 
Third, technological advance has made the concept of “natural monop- 
oly,” which was used  as the basis for some regulation,  largely obsolete. 
What used to be considered “natural monopolies,” such as long-distance 
telephone service, railroads, and airlines, have been privatized with success 
in many countries. Fixed costs have become smaller, and advances in soft- 
ware technology have made it possible to increase the productivity of the 
existing capital stock. 
1. See Boltuck and Litan (1991) for a good analysis of the divergence between antidump- 
ing measures used to prevent predatory pricing and the reality of antidumping measures as 
actually practiced in the United States. Introduction  3 
At the same time as calls for a worldwide competition policy have in- 
creased, however, economists and others have begun questioning the effi- 
ciency of regulation for other reasons, noting that sometimes the regulated 
have benefited from oversight, and that sometimes regulation of “natural 
monopolies” has  given  them more market  power  than  the  enterprises 
would have had if left alone. The move to more efficient domestic regula- 
tion, which has resulted in deregulation in some industries, privatization 
in others, and changes in regulatory regimes in still others, has been one 
outcome. It is now widely recognized that efficient regulation takes place 
when social welfare is increased through government actions that, at the 
least cost, increase consumer welfare. In some instances, there is consider- 
ably more competition than was earlier thought, either because technol- 
ogy has increased the choices available or because earlier regulators simply 
failed to recognize potential alternatives. Indeed, in some instances, regu- 
lation itself has served as a major barrier to entry. In other instances, at- 
tempted intervention-public  ownership, for example-has  simply failed 
to achieve results even equal to those achievable with private monopoly. 
Many of the sectors most affected by changes in the regulatory environ- 
ment are critical to the success of  exporters and significantly affect the 
competitive positions of producers in a number of industries. Financial 
services, for example, are rapidly being deregulated, in part because of the 
great cost advantages they provide for users of those services in countries 
where the costs of financial services are low. Telecommunications  markets 
are rapidly being broken into their component parts, with competition 
among suppliers introduced wherever feasible. As with financial services, 
the availability of  cheap telecommunications facilities gives yet  another 
competitive edge to exporters. 
As these changes are taking place, producers everywhere are becoming 
more sensitive to anything that affects their costs and margins relative to 
their foreign competitors. In part this is because of the great reduction in 
barriers to trade from the levels that earlier prevailed through transport 
and communications costs and through tariffs and other trade barriers. 
The eighth annual National Bureau of Economic Research-East  Asia 
Seminar on Economics was held in Taipei in June 1997 to consider these 
issues as they relate to the Asia-Pacific region. The papers presented at 
that conference provide interesting insights into the extent to which the 
deregulation problems of the countries of the region are similar, and into 
the gains that can result from improved regulatory or competitive environ- 
ments for business services. 
In chapter 1 Roger No11 examines the ways in which international trade 
considerations impinge on policy decisions regarding the regulatory envi- 
ronment. As he notes, trade friction over differences between regulatory 
regimes has increased markedly. This has led to calls for an “international 
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Such an effort might cut in two ways. On one hand, it might impose stricter 
regulation on industries in some countries than nationals would prefer 
and might indeed even be a way for some countries to protect their own 
industries.2  On the other hand, there are clearly instances in which regu- 
latory regimes impose costs “artificially” on producers in one country in 
ways that deprive those producers, who may be low cost, of their competi- 
tive advantage. No11 nicely illustrates this in table 1.1. 
No11 starts by telling the “tale of the teleshopper,” indicating how many 
different steps and costs, both artificial and real, may lie between the retail 
consumer and the producer. As he demonstrates, protection of domestic 
sellers can come about through such means as policies that supply low- 
quality access lines at high usage prices, through policies that regulate 
domestic package delivery, or in border delays. Thus not only have barri- 
ers to trade fallen sharply, but all sorts of economic activities that were 
previously of concern only for domestic economic activity now affect the 
ability of foreigners to compete in domestic markets. Interestingly, No11 
blames these regulatory trade distortions for spurring regional and bilat- 
eral trade agreements. 
No11  then discusses mechanisms for rationalizing regulatory objectives 
and methods. He focuses on the unnecessary costs of regulation, and ways 
that they can be  avoided. He provides a careful analysis of the types of 
situations in which efficient government interventions may be called for. 
He examines regulatory regimes that promote competition, frameworks 
for preventing natural monopolists from abusing their power, and social 
regulation (including environmental concerns and protective standards). 
No11  concludes by  examining ways  in  which competition policy, proce- 
dural reforms-especially  focusing on mandatory cost-benefit analysis- 
and internationalization can all bring about more efficient regulatory re- 
gimes. 
Whereas Roger Noll’s paper focuses on the implications of internation- 
alization for regulatory reform issues, Sadao Nagaoka examines the fea- 
tures of international trade that impinge on competition policy. He starts 
with a review of trade theory and analyzes the behavior of producers with 
a degree of  monopoly power  that might result  in  a reduction in social 
welfare, either of the producing country or of consumers in the rest of the 
world. He then uses that framework to analyze Japan’s competition policy. 
As Nagaoka points out, international trade itself generally brings about 
2. To date, the greatest danger of protection appearing in the guise of common standards 
would appear to be conditions surrounding the employment of labor. Calls for labor stan- 
dards are most frequently heard emanating from workers’ representatives in rich countries. 
It is clear that raising labor costs in countries with abundant unskilled labor would deprive 
these countries of part of their comparative advantage. Another area where calls for common 
standards have been heard is environmental protection. Again, there are a number of issues, 
especially when there is little or no evidence of international spillovers. Introduction  5 
greater competition for home producers than occurs when production is 
confined to the home market (or is protected for the home market). He 
examines Japanese anticartel policy, noting that it has become stricter over 
the years. Ironically, however,  as anticartel policy has succeeded, firms 
have been accused of dumping in foreign markets when in fact they have 
been selling at lower prices due to greater competition. Instead of benefit- 
ing from price reductions, foreigners have through antidumping measures 
insisted on higher prices, thus reducing their own welfare when in fact it 
should have increased. 
In addition to breaking up cartels, Japan has regulated mergers and 
acquisitions fairly strictly and has prevented vertical restraints of  trade 
primarily by applying sections of the unfair trade practices law. Nagaoka 
concludes by noting that international regulation through national treat- 
ment is highly desirable because it will prevent rent-shifting policies that 
can otherwise result through regulation. He also calls for measures to con- 
tain the ability of antidumping measures to offset the gains that might 
otherwise result from competition policy, noting that antidumping legisla- 
tion as carried out in fact works against a desirable competition policy. 
In chapter 3 Frank Wolak considers how changing the regulatory re- 
gime has affected markets and  price behavior in  electricity. Wolak  de- 
scribes the changing structure of the electricity industry, once thought to 
be a perfect case of natural monopoly. He describes how companies be- 
have in response to incentives after deregulation. He uses evidence on the 
design of electricity markets in England and Wales, Norway and Sweden, 
Australia, and New Zealand. Features of the market structure, the type of 
power generation, and the market rules are characterized for each country. 
Then Wolak analyzes the relationship between market rules, market struc- 
ture, and the behavior of  prices. He argues that although electricity is 
no longer considered to be  a natural monopoly, it is  also not perfectly 
competitive. Controlling market power is an important policy issue, and 
his analysis shows that there is no one framework that suits all situations, 
and that careful analysis of each situation is called for. 
The next three papers consider the regulation of service industries. In 
chapter 4  Motoshige Itoh addresses the Japanese distribution system and 
the related issue of market access by foreign companies. The Japanese dis- 
tribution  sector was  a focus of  trade negotiations between  the  United 
States and Japan in the late 1980s because the United States claimed that 
restrictions placed  on the construction  of  shopping malls and discount 
stores by the Japanese Large Scale Retail Store Law effectively created a 
trade barrier to imports. Statistics show that Japan had more small and 
medium-size stores per capita than any other advanced country. Because 
large retail stores carry more imported goods than small neighborhood 
stores, this allegedly contributed to Japan’s trade surpluses. 
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system as well  as the legal situation. The Large Scale Retail Store Law 
was liberalized twice, in 1990 and 1994, and then abolished in 1998. Itoh 
attributes the change to the “motorization” of Japanese society. As more 
city dwellers have come to afford autos, demands for large discount stores 
have increased. He is skeptical of  whether the liberalization of  the law 
contributed to increased imports, attributing most of the expansion to the 
yen appreciation after 1985. 
Itoh also analyzes changes in the distribution system since 1985 and 
shows that costs have been reduced not only in large discount stores but 
also in convenience stores (such as Seven-Eleven Japan) and specialized 
small stores. Itoh concludes that changes in tastes and lifestyles drove the 
changes in the distribution sector in Japan. 
In chapter 5 Changqi Wu and Leonard Cheng consider Hong Kong’s 
regulation of  business services. Hong Kong’s economy is  remarkable in 
the extent to which it has transformed from a manufacturing-based econ- 
omy to one based on services. As Hong Kong has become a major trader in 
services, the government has deregulated and liberalized markets for tele- 
communications, public transport, and electricity. Wu and Cheng charac- 
terize the shift as being primarily one “from regulation to competition.” 
They first trace the history of monopoly regulation in Hong Kong. Reg- 
ulation seems to have started mostly in the 1950s and 1960s, along tradi- 
tional lines with permitted rates of return on electricity production, local 
telephone service, public bus service, and transport services. But with the 
1990s, deregulation came in all these industries, and the government began 
replacing rate-of-return regulation with measures to achieve more compe- 
tition. There are now four companies competing in telecommunications 
(compared to one company earlier) and three bus companies, and there 
will shortly be two companies competing in cargo services at the airport, 
contrasted with the earlier monopoly positions in each of these areas. 
Wu and Cheng show that rate-of-return regulation induced the electric- 
ity company to raise the capital-labor ratio more than was desirable on 
economic efficiency grounds. They also show that the rate of total factor 
productivity growth in  electric power  was  negligible during the period 
when rate-of-return regulation was in effect, and that firms invested in ex- 
cess capacity. 
They then contrast  the poor performance of  the regulated electricity 
industry with that of the telecommunications service industry and show 
that regulated telecommunications was much like electricity: once deregu- 
lation and liberalization, accompanied by  appropriate conditions applied 
to suppliers (number portability, restrictions on discrimination in access 
fees, etc.), had begun, the growth rate of revenues increased markedly, and 
Hong Kong Telecommunications announced  plans  for  significant cut- 
backs in the number of  employees as a cost-reducing measure, despite 
rapid growth in output. Introduction  7 
Wu and Cheng regard Hong Kong as being in the midst of a transition 
from rate-of-return regulation to liberalization and competition within an 
appropriate  set of  guidelines. They note that  some industries have ad- 
vanced further than others, and that there remain a number of sheltered 
segments among Hong Kong’s business service industries. 
The other paper examining transportation services and deregulation is 
chapter 6,  by Hirotaka Yamauchi. In his paper, Yamauchi outlines airline 
deregulation policy in Japan. In the old regime prior to 1986, the Ministry 
of Transport strictly controlled routing and airfares, viewing the industry 
as a natural monopoly. Japan Airlines was designated the international 
airline, All Nippon Airways the major domestic carrier, and Toa Domestic 
Airlines (now Japan Air Systems) the local route airline. Virtually no dis- 
count airfares, except for multiple-coupon discounts for the same route, 
were available. The U.S.-Japan Airline Service Treaty granted very favor- 
able rights to US. airlines. With these handicaps, Japanese airlines did not 
innovate in management. 
Yamauchi then describes the emergence of dynamics for deregulation 
and the airline industry’s evolution in the 1990s. An interesting part of the 
story is how the movement to rectify “unequal” treatment between U.S. 
and Japanese airlines spilled over into domestic deregulation because al- 
lowing entry of an airline (Nippon Cargo Airlines) meant the end of the old 
regime. After a decade, regulations have greatly changed. By  1998, airfares 
in Japan were deregulated, and the US.-Japan Airline Service Treaty was 
renegotiated so that rights have been equalized. 
The next four papers all examine the liberalization of the financial ser- 
vice sector. Two papers examine the situation in Taiwan, one paper deals 
with Hong Kong, and one treats Korea. Chang analyzes the deregulation 
of financial services in chapter 7. He starts by noting the traditional hostil- 
ity of the Taiwanese authorities to services, in contrast to their preferential 
treatment of manufacturing industries. In consequence, there was a strong 
regulatory environment for financial services. This in turn resulted in  a 
bifurcated financial system, with a formal and an informal sector. Until 
deregulation, the formal sector consisted almost entirely of publicly owned 
(or, what was the same thing, ruling party  owned) banks and financial 
institutions. As late as 1990, 94 percent of financial institutions were pub- 
licly owned. Among the other negative effects of this structure, small and 
medium-size enterprises were  systematically deprived of access to credit 
from the formal sector, even when they were in activities that were entitled 
to preferential credit. There is also evidence that the banking sector was 
inefficient in a number of ways. 
In the 1990s, reforms started. A new banking law came into effect, and 
the process of liberalization began. Interest rates were decontrolled, pri- 
vate banks were permitted to enter, the foreign exchange market was sig- 
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concludes that international pressures have, to a considerable extent, been 
responsible for deregulation, which has, in any event, not gone as rapidly 
as it might have. The informal  sector still exists, probably because the 
older banks have not entirely adjusted to the new environment. 
Whereas Chang concentrates on the issues that gave rise to reforms and 
the inefficiencies of the former system, in chapter 8 Wu and Hu analyze 
the effects of deregulation to date. They focus on the impact of Taiwanese 
financial deregulation on spreads between lending and deposit rates and 
differentials between official and informal interest rates. They find greater 
fluctuation in interest rates in both the formal and informal sectors prior 
to the liberalization of interest rates. Also, the spreads between lending 
and deposit interest rates of domestic and local foreign banks fell after 
1991. They attribute this decline to the entry of private commercial banks 
and greater competition in the Taiwanese banking system. 
The differential between informal and formal sector interest rates did 
not shrink, however. Wu and Hu attribute this result to the increased risk 
premium resulting when commercial banks could take on riskier loans, 
thus leading to greater riskiness of the average informal sector loan. Over- 
all, they conclude that financial  liberalization in  Taiwan has increased 
efficiency and reduced costs in the financial system. 
Kang traces the liberalization of the Korean banking system in chapter 
9. In the Korean case, the chief objective seems to have been to strengthen 
the financial system, partly in response to foreign competition. However, 
the Korean authorities were aware that some banks held a number of non- 
performing loans in their portfolios and therefore thought that liberaliza- 
tion should proceed slowly so that these banks would have time to adjust. 
Legislation to guide liberalization was passed in 1988, but liberalization 
was to take ten years and go through several phases. Kang believes that 
the key changes came about in the early 1990s, when interest rate ceilings 
were liberalized. He examines the behavior of  deposit and lending rates 
and concludes that interest rate spreads have come down significantly for 
national banks but not for regional banks. Accompanying this was a drop 
in the profitability of banking. These results seem to be attributable to the 
existence of less competition at the regional level. 
Kang concludes by  noting that a considerable distance remains in fi- 
nancial liberalization, and that a recent commission on the financial sector 
recommended the remaining steps be undertaken in a “big bang” rather 
than at the gradual pace of reforms to date. 
Hong  Kong seems to have started with an even more rigid banking 
sector than Taiwan or Korea, as there had been a cartel of banks starting 
from the 1890s. As Kwan and Lui discuss in chapter 10, the case of Hong 
Kong is of special interest, not least because it is one of the large interna- 
tional financial centers. 
Until deregulation, interest rate caps in Hong Kong had highly distor- Introduction  9 
tionary effects: with the Hong Kong dollar tied to the U.S. dollar, the 
interest rate had to be close to the U.S. rate; but since inflation was higher 
in Hong Kong, the resulting real interest rate was often negative. Deregu- 
lation of  interest  rate  caps took  place  early in  1995, and competition 
among banks increased greatly. Kwan and Lui use available data to test 
for interest rate spreads and the profitability of banks, and they show that 
spreads decreased significantly. Interestingly enough, banking profitability 
did not decline. The authors attribute this result to the banks’ response to 
the removal of interest rate caps: they began offering new services and 
simultaneously began accepting riskier loans. 
Another crucial area of business services is telecommunications. Histor- 
ically, telecommunications were viewed as a natural monopoly and regu- 
lated or owned by  governments. Technological change has provided the 
means for competition and allowed movement toward more market-based 
services. Issues are complicated, however, because of concerns relating to 
network access (which may be owned by the preexisting company) and the 
fact  that  opportunities  for competition  differ from  activity to activity 
within the telecommunications industry. As chapters  11 through  14, on 
Taiwan, Korea, China, and the United States show, no country has yet 
successfully completed the transition from full regulation or government 
ownership to private markets for telecommunications. But all four govern- 
ments are trying to achieve more efficient, lower cost telecommunications 
services by liberalizing their regimes. 
Chen  views Taiwan’s telecommunications  liberalization  as being  “in 
process.” A governmental department, the Directorate General of Tele- 
communications (DGT), operated and regulated all telecommunications 
equipment until the late 1980s. An earlier liberalization attempt in the late 
1970s failed because of opposition from trade unions. During the thirty 
years prior to the start of liberalization in the late 1980s, there was excep- 
tionally rapid growth in demand, and the DGT expanded telecommunica- 
tions services rapidly, from 0.29 telephone mainlines per  100 inhabitants 
in 1950 to 32.1 in 1991 and 41.3 in 1996. Even with the rapid growth prior 
to  1990, demand continued  to grow more rapidly still, and discontent 
emerged over the long waiting period for a phone and deteriorating qual- 
ity of service. 
In Taiwan (and in Korea, as Nam documents), telecommunications pol- 
icy came into conflict with, among other things, industrial policy, as the 
authorities sought to induce domestic firms to produce telecommunica- 
tions equipment; this often resulted in the use of outmoded equipment in 
operations. The DGT had taken a stake in three local suppliers, subsidiar- 
ies of foreign firms, creating a less than competitive environment for tele- 
communications equipment. 
When liberalization did start in Taiwan in the late 1980s, international 
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communications liberalization was limited; however, the market for cus- 
tomer premises equipment was liberalized, as well as some related services, 
as competition was permitted. Moreover, a set of laws proposed in 1996 
is intended to take the process much further. Among other things, the law 
split off  the regulatory arm of the DGT from its operating arm, which 
then faces competition in most of its activities. 
Chen reports that to date the program has been subject to numerous 
criticisms, both because of ambiguity as to what the law covers and be- 
cause many aspects of industry operation are still regulated. The DGT 
continues to use rate-of-return regulation, which induces operators to in- 
vest more than is economically efficient. There is also a 20 percent limita- 
tion on permitted foreign capital. Chen notes that regulation can be inimi- 
cal to the entry of new techniques and new services, especially when, as 
in Taiwan, different services are regulated separately. There are also ques- 
tions about the extent to which Chunghwa Telecom, the operating spinoff 
from the DGT, is favored by the DGT in its regulations. 
In considering telecommunications liberalization in  Korea, Nam  re- 
ports a very similar story. Telecommunications  was a government monop- 
oly, with international and domestic service provided by  the government, 
and no separate regulatory authority until the late 1980s. The government 
has since moved to liberalize telecommunications but has continued with 
rate regulation and, in addition, has tended to set access charges more to 
protect the profits of new entrants than on economic efficiency grounds. 
Nam believes that needed (and feasible) competition has not yet been al- 
lowed to permeate the telecommunications industry. 
Whereas Korea and Taiwan are in the process of liberalizing telecom- 
munications, Lu reports that China still regulates the industry, where de- 
mand and delivery have both grown very rapidly. Foreigners are not yet 
permitted in the industry, and there has, to date, been little effort to be- 
gin deregulation. 
As for the United States, Crandall notes that it has been deregulating 
and liberalizing telecommunications for thirty years without completing 
the process. He believes that in the United States, the political demand to 
provide universal access at virtually identical prices (and the cross-subsidy 
resulting from that) has basically impeded liberalization. As he points out, 
unless prices are allowed to reflect costs, one cannot expect competition 
to perform the regulatory role that it might otherwise. Crandall draws 
four key  lessons from the U.S.  experience: (1) rate distortions should be 
eliminated before introducing competition;  (2) unbundling of  essential 
facilities should be of limited duration, encouraging new entrants to build 
their own facilities (with greater competition resulting); (3) a date certain 
should be established when rates will be  deregulated after entry barriers 
have been removed; and (4) regulations should be restricted to requiring 
reciprocal interconnection after rate and service deregulation occurs. Introduction  11 
The similarities between financial deregulation, where nonperforming 
loans in the portfolios of existing institutions create concerns for authori- 
ties set on deregulation, and telecommunications deregulation, where pric- 
ing regulations or considerations prevent competition, are striking. As ex- 
perience with deregulation and liberalization proceeds, it is likely that new 
means for addressing these issues will be found, and that comparative ex- 
perience and international pressures will continue to push the liberaliza- 
tion process forward across many business service sectors. 
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